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ABSTRACT
Thispaper uses disaggregated data on bank balance sheets to provide a test of the lending
view of monetary policy transmission. We argue that if the lending view is correct, one should
expect the loan and security portfolios of large and small banks to respond differentially to a
contraction in monetary policy. We first develop this point with a theoretical model; we then
test to see if the model's predictions are borne out in the data.
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When the Federal Reserve tightens monetary policy, it exchanges bonds for bank
reserves. A longstanding question is whether this interaction with the banking system has any
effects beyond those on bond-market interest rates. That is, in addition to the textbook "money"
channel, does monetary policy also work in part through a distinct "bank lending" channel?
Over the last few years, there has been a resurgence of interest in this question, and it
has generated a good deal of both new research and controversy. In this paper, we propose to
attack the question from a quite different angle than has other recent work, by examining what
the so-called "lending view" has to say about cross-sectional differences in the way that bank
balance sheets respond to a monetary policy shock. More specifically, we argue that if the
tending view is correct, one should expect the loan and security portfolios of large and small
banks to respond differentially to a contraction in monetary policy. We first develop this point
with a theoretical model; then we then test to see if our predictions are borne out in the data.
By focusing on disaggregated bank data, we can most directly address what skeptics seem
tothink is the weakest part of the case for the lending view: the proposition that the Fed can,
simply by changing reserves, affect banks' loan supply schedules. A number of authors have
argued that this proposition is theoretically dubious. For example, Romer and Romer (1990)
emphasize that banks can always, if needed, finance themselves with non-deposit sources of
funds. Thus even if contractionary Fed policy can reduce the deposit financing available to the
banking sector, banks can simply and frictionlessly make up the shortfall by issuing, say, large
denomination CD's, medium-term notes, or some other security. The bottom line, according
to Romer and Romer (1990) and others,is that bank loan supply is effectively completely
1insulated from Fed policy.
This argumentis just anapplication of Modigliani-Miller logic to the banking firm. In
an M-M world, shocks to the liability side of a bank's balance sheet should not affect its "real
side" behavior, namely its willingness to supply loans for a given interest rate. Therefore, in
order to make a convincing case for a lending channel of monetary policy transmission, one has
to establish that the M-M argument does not apply to banking firms in this context. That is, one
has to show that because of capital market imperfections, shocks to banks' deposit base cannot
be frictionlessly offset with other sources of financing, and therefore translate into "real" effects
on their lending behavior.
We attempt to do so in two basic steps. First, we develop a theoretical model that is
designed to: I) illustrate how the existence of capital market imperfections facing the typical
bankingfirmcan generate a lending channel; 2) highlight the cross-sectional differences between
banks with differentdegreesof access to non-deposit financing that arise when there are such
capital market imperfections. Perhaps the most important thing to emphasize about this model
of the banking firm is that it is exactly the same sort of model that has been widely applied to
study the implications of capital market imperfections for non-financial companies.
Our second step is to begin to test the cross-sectional implications of this model
empirically. Again, the types of tests that we use are very closely analogous to those used to
study the investment behavior of non-financial firms. Loosely speaking, we test the following
sort of prediction of our model: Fed tightening should have a disproportionately large impact
on the lending behavior of smaller banks, who are more likely to have difficulty substituting into
non-deposit sources of external finance. This directly parallels the empirical strategy in the
2literature on non-financial firms, where the test is typically of the following sort: shocks to
internal liquidity should havea largerimpact on the investment behavior of smaller companies,
who are more likely to have a hard time accessing external sources of finance.
We stress the close relationship between our work here on banking firms and previous
work on non-financial firms that face capital market imperfections, because of what we see as
a curious dissonance in the recent literature on monetary policy. On the one hand, as we discuss
below, even most skeptics of the lending view have been very willing to embrace the importance
of capital market imperfections at the level of the non-financial firm. However, at the same
time, these same skeptics have implicitly tended to dismiss--often without any real direct
evidence--the possibility of similar imperfections at the level of the banking firm.
In our view, there is no a priori reason to think that capital market imperfections should
be less important for banking firms than for non-financial firms. Indeed, one might well expect
them to be pronounced,to the extent that these imperfections have their roots in
information asymmetries between firms and their external capital suppliers. After all, banks
specialize in holding portfolios of hard-to-value assets--assets for which information asymmetries
tend to be substantial.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief
overview of where the debate on the lending view now stands, and use this to motivate in more
detail why our focus on the behavior of different types of banks can be helpful. In Section 3,
we develop our model. Section 4 describes the data to be used in the empirical work, and
Section 5 presents our empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
32. Where the Debate on the LendinE View Stands
Inthissection,we provide a very brief sketch of the current state of play in the debate
over thelending view of monetary policytransmission. Our aim is not tobeexhaustive,but
ratherto give a quick idea of what sorts of empirical strategies have been adopted thus far.'
This will help to motivate why we take the particular approach we do in this paper.
2.1ADefinitionof the Lendin2 View
Forthe purposes of clarity, it is useful to begin by defining exactly what we mean by the
lending view. It is perhaps easiest to do so by contrasting the lending view of monetary policy
transmissionwith the simplerand better known, 'money" view. In what we take to be the
polar, puremoneyversionofthe transmission mechanism,thereare only two assets--money and
bonds,anda singleinterestrate. This interest rate is taken to be a summarystatisticfor all
creditmarketconditions.That is,it istobethought ofas simultaneouslycapturing the return
on governmentbonds, banks loans,real capital,etc.The textbook IS-LM model's version of
monetarytransmission is one exampleofwhat we wouldcall thepure money view.2
There isa long literature that takes issue with the notion that a simpletwo-asset/one-
interest-ratemodel issufficientto capturethe workings of monetary policy. In response to this
perceived shortcoming, Brainard (1964), TobinandBrainard (1963), Tobin(1970) andBrunner
and Meltzer (1963, 1972, 1988) propose general equilibrium, multi-asset models which feature
'See Kashyap and Stein (forthcoming) for a detailed survey.
2Note however, that as we have defined the pure money view of the transmission mechanism—solely
by reference to its simple two-asset feature—there are a wide range of alternative formulations that capture
its essence. In addition to the lS-LM model, these include the dynamic equilibrium cash-in-advance
models of Rotemberg (1984) Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Lucas (1990).
4imperfect substitutability amongst a number of assets, and hence allow in principle for a number
of differentinterest rates. We follow Bernankeand Blinder (1988) and interpret the lending
view as a specific special case of these multi-asset models. In particular, in the lending view,
there are flow exactly three assets--money, bonds, and bank loans--that differ from each other
inmeaningfulways and must be accounted for separately when analyzing the impact of monetary
policyshocks.
Inthisthree-assetworld, monetarypolicycanworknotonly throughitsimpact on the
bond-marketrateofinterest,but also through its independentimpacton thesupplyof bank
loans.Forexample, even ifacontraction inpolicy has littleeffect on the bond-marketrate,
itcan in some circumstances have a very significant effect on the spread between loans and
bonds, and therefore on the investment of those firms that rely on banks for financing. This
latter effect is what we would call the lending channel in action.
Bernanke and Blinder's model makes it clear that there are two necessary conditions that
must both hold for there to be a distinct lending channel of monetary policy transmission:
1) some firms must be dependent on bank loans--i.e., some firms must be unable to frictionlessly
substitute between bank loans and other forms of finance; 2) the Fed must be able, simply by
conducting open market operations, to shift banks' loan supply schedules.' As we notedin the
Introduction, and as we will discuss in more detail momentarily, it is the plausibility of the latter
condition that seems to be most in doubt.
'In addition, like alt models of monetary non-neutrality, there must be some form of imperfect price
adjustment.
52.2 TestsUsinE Aagreate Data
An important empirical paper thathelped torekindle interest in the lending view is
Bernanke and Blinder (1992). Their approach is simple and commonsensical: they look to see
how aggregate bank balance sheet variables respond to changes in the stance of monetary policy,
as proxied for by changes in the fed funds rate. They find that when the Fed tightens, bank
deposits drop immediately. Bank holdings of securities also fall immediately. Bank loans
respond with something of a lag, but they too eventually decline. Finally, measures of aggregate
output also respond to monetary impulses with a similar lag, thus declining roughly
contemporaneously with bank loans.
While the Bernanke and Blinder (1992) findings are certainly consistent with the lending
view, they also admit other interpretations. For example, one way to read their results is that
tight monetary policy operates solely through the standard money channel to depress economic
output and to reduce the demand for credit. Thus there can be induced correlations between
monetary policy, bank lending and overall activity even if there is no lending channel.
In an effort to resolve this identification problem, Kashyap, Stun and Wilcox (1993),
henceforth KSW, consider the relative fluctuations in bank loans and a leading substitute for
bank loans: commercial paper. They find that when the Fed tightens, commercialpaper issuance
rises sharply, even while bank loans are falling.4 This makes it more likely that what has taken
place is an inward shift in loan jjpjy, as suggested by the lending view, rather than just an
inward shift in loan demand.
'As Friedman and Kuttner (1993) emphasize, there is anasymmetry in the movements of the two
variables: the commercial paper response is both faster and stronger than the loanresponse.
6However, not everyone has accepted the 1$W results as completely decisive either. The
gist ofthe objections, as put forth by Oliner andRudebusch (1993)andothers is this: KSW
achieveidentification of loan supply effects under the implicitassumption that monetary policy
shocks affectthe demand for funds in a homogeneous fashion. But suppose instead, thatfor
someunspecifiedreason,declines inaggregate demand fall disproportionately on the shoulders
of smallerfirms. If this is the case, small firms' demand for credit may fall mr than large
firms' demand for credit. Hence commercial paper volume,whichlargely reflects large firm
borrowing, may rise relative to bank loans, even in the absence of a movement in bank loan
supply.
These sorts of objections suggest that it may be hard to completely settle the debate using
aggregate data. Unless one is willing to impose some a priori restrictions on the nature of
credit-demand side shocks, it seems unlikely that one can unambiguously identify loan supply
effects with the sort of aggregate "mix" variables used by KSW—almost any movement in the
composition of external finance can be explained away by appealing to a sufficiently creative
story about heterogeneity in credit demand.
2.3 Tests Using DisagEregated Data on Non-Financial Firms
Given the inherent ambiguities associated with relying exclusively on aggregate data, a
natural next step is to use disaggregated data to explore some of the cross-sectional implications
of the lending view. In particular, the lending view predicts that tight monetary policy should
pose more of a problem for small firms, who rely primarily on banks,than for large firms, who
typically have greater access to non-bank sources of external finance.
7A number of recent papers provide evidence that is consistent with this prediction, among
them Gertler and Hubbard(1988), Gertlerand Gilchrist (forthcoming), Kashyap, Lamont and
Stein (forthcoming), and Oliner and Rudebusch (1994). Loosely speaking, all these papers can
be interpreted as showing that after a tightening of monetary policy, liquidity constraints become
significantly more pronounced for small firms.
Again, however, while these findings fit very nicely with the predictions of the lending
view, they also are open to other interpretations. Specifically, it may be that the decline in
economic activity that follows a contraction in monetary policy leads to an erosion of the value
of small firms' collateral. In a world of information and/or agency problems, such a "collateral
shock" will make it harder for small firms to raise external financing of any sort. Thus the
increased liquidity constraints may not reflect an inward shift in just bank loan supply, but rather
a more general deterioration of small firms' creditworthiness. In other words, the evidence
strongly rejects the implications of a frictionless capital market, but does not necessarily pinpoint
the nature of the deviation from perfect markets.
Indeed, most of those who have been skeptical of the pure bank lending view have
embraced the collateral shock interpretation of the data. A noteworthy example is Oliner and
Rudebusch (1994), who refer to this as a "broad credit channel"; see also Ramey (1993) foran
endorsement of this view. What seems slightly odd is that in advancing, this so-called broad
credit channel, these authors are explicitly emphasizing the importance ofcapital market
imperfections at the level of the non-financial firm. At the same time, in dismissing the
narrower bank lending view, they are implicitly rejecting the importance of exactly the same sort
of imperfections at the level of the banking firm.
82.4 Our Auproach: Tests Using DisaEreated Data on Banks
As the above suggestc, it now seems to be quite widely accepted that capitalmarket
imperfections at the level of non-financialfirms can play a role in shaping the transmission of
monetary policy. Thus debate on the lendingview has boiled down to the following question:
canthe Fed, merely by altering reserves, alter the loan supply behavior of banks? Or are banks,
as Romer and Romer (1990) suggest, M-M creatures whose lending is unaffected by changes
in their deposit liabilities?
To address this questionmostdirectly,one needs to look at how banking firms respond
tochanges in the stance of monetary policy. To oversimplify slightly, our empirical strategy
can be thought of as a disaggregated version of that in Bernanke and Blinder (1992).Like they
do, we will look at how bank deposits, securities holdings and loans respond toshocks in
monetarypolicy.Unlikein their paper, however, our focus will be on cross-sectional
differencesin these responses across banksofdifferent sizes.
Before proceeding, we should emphasize that such a disaggregated approach has both a
benefitand acost. Thebenefitis thatwe can hopefullymake more progressonthe specific
questionarticulated just above, namely: are banks M-M creatures with respect to Fed-induced
deposit shocks?Thecost isthatour data isnotappropriate for gauging theaEErezate
importanceofany deviations from M-M at the bank level. For example,even if we find that
Fed tightening leads to a pronounced contraction in bank loan supply, we cannotwith our data
sayhowmuch thisultimately impactsinvestment at the level of non-financial firms. Perhaps
thenon-financial firms can switch to alternative sourcesoffunds at relatively low cost, so the
9overall impact on investment is only modest.3
3. The Model
This section develops a model of bank portfolio behavior. As stated above, the main
goals are: 1) to show how capital market imperfections at the bank level can generate a lending
channel of monetary policy transmission; and 2) to derive cross-sectional predictions about how
such capital market imperfections differentially shape the portfolio response of large and small
banks to a monetary shock. Thesecross-sectionalpredictions can then be used to test the model.
It should be noted that the model is only partial equilibrium in nature. Since we are only
making cross-sectional comparisons, we do not tie down the Treasury market rate, but rather
just fix it exogenously. Also, we adopt a very simplistic view of how monetary policy affects
individual banks' deposit bases. In our model, when the Fed tightens, all banks see their
deposits fall by the same amount, and they can do nothing to offset this fall. That is, we do not
allow for inter-bank competition for deposits. The model can be generalized to allow for such
inter-bank competition, but this does not alter the basic cross-sectional predictions that we focus
on.
We begin by specifying banks' asset and liability choices, taking the return on bank loans
as exogenous. We then close the model with two alternative specifications of loan demand.
However, there is a substantial literature that suggests that bank loans are in fact "special" for some
tirms, so that such switching would not be frictionless. See Kashyap and Stein (fonhcoming) for a
discussion and references.
103.1 Bank Asset and Liability Management
Our model has two time periods. As will become clear, this is done as a minimalist way
of generating a "precautionary", or "buffer stock" motive for banks to hold securities in the first
period.
Ineach of thetwo periods, a bank's balance sheet has two items on the asset side, and
twoontheliability side.On the asset side, the bank can make loans of L at time 1. These
loans yield a return of r.For thetime being; ris takenas exogenous;itwillbeendogenized
belowwhen we develop the loan demand side of the model. Once made, these loans cannot be
liquidated at time 2. Thus the bank must hold loans of at least L at time 2. Indeed, tomake
things especially simple, we assume that no new lending opportunities arise at time 2, so the
loan balance remains exactly at L at this time.
This formulation is more extreme than it needs to be. All that matters for our results is
that banks face some cost in liquidating loans early.6 We are simply taking the polar case
where this cost of early liquidation is infinite.
The bank can also invest an amount S in securities at time 1. These securities, which
can be thought of as Treasury bills, yield a return that is normalized to zero.Thus the yield on
loans, r, is really a measure of the loan-security spread. In this sense, ris a pure measure of
the lending channel of monetary policy. That is, if a monetary contraction increases rin our
model, this will be a manifestation of the lending channel in action. Conversely,if r is
endogenously determined to be equal to zero at all times, this means thatthe lending channel
does not exist.
°This assumption is a standard one—see. e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
11The key difference between loans and securities is that securities can be costlessly
liquidated at time 2. As will become clear, it is because of this better "liquidity" that banks will
in equilibrium choose to hold securities at time 1 even when they offer an inferior return to
loans--i.e., even when r > 0.
On the liability side, one important source of financing for banks is demand deposits.
At time 1, deposits are M1, and at time 2, they are M2. We assume that M1 and M2 are out of
the control of individual banks, and are determined by Federal Reserve policy. That is, by
tightening policy at time 1, the Fed effectively creates a net funding shock for the typical bank.'
Our principal focusbelowwill be on the effect of a change in M1 on a bank's holding
of loans and securities, L and S respectively. However, this effect will depend on the stochastic
structure of shocks to M3 and M2 .Inparticular, we need to specify both 1) the extent to which
a shock to M1 is persistent or temporary; and 2) the degree of uncertainty at time 1 surrounding
the realization of M2.
To do so, we pick the following simple formulation. Once M1 is realized, it is common
knowledge that M, is distributed as follows:
'This is obviously a gross oversimplification. What we have in mind is that by controllingreserves,
the Fed can control the anre2ate amount of reservable deposits. In general, ofcourse, this does not
mean that it can directly control the deposits of any given individual bank. However, if banks are
prohibited from competing amongst each other for deposits (say because of interest rate ceilings) no
individualbankwill be able to take any action to offset an erosion of its own deposits. In this case, when
theFedtightens, the typicalbankwill experience an exogenous shock to its deposits of the sort that we
assume.
In a world without interest rate ceilings on deposits, things are somewhat more complicated.
Now any individual bank can react to a tightening in Fed policy by competing more aggressively for
deposits, so it does not view its level of deposits as exogenous. However, the empirical predictions that
we focus on continue to hold in such a setting.
12M2 isuniform on [pM1 +(l-p)M - 7/2, pM1+ (l-p)M + 7/2] (1)
ThusM2 is uniformly distributed with a meanofpM1 + (1-p)M. The parameter p is a measure
of the persistence of monetary shocks--the larger is p, the more permanent are the shocks. The
parameter y is a measure of the variance of these shocks.
Finally, in addition to deposits, banks can also finance themselves by raising non-deposit
external finance at both times 1 and 2. We denote the incremental amounts raised at these times
by E, and E2 respectively.Thus at time 2, the total amount of non-deposit finance on the
bank's balance sheet is B1 +B7.
The model captures the notion that, when the Fed tightens, banks have alternative ways
to raise funds--they are not limited to simply cutting loans or securities. Our variables E1 and
E2 can be thought of as a catch-all category for any sources of bank funding that are outside the
control of the Fed's reserve policy. This would include large denomination CD's--if such CD's
are not subject to reserve requirements--as well as many other funding vehicles such as medium-
term notes, subordinated debt, equity issues, etc.8
Our entire model hinges on the assumptions we make about the costs of raising non-
deposit external finance. We assume that the costs at time 1 are given by a1E12/2, and
analogously, the costs at time 2 are given by a2E22/2. The specific functional form is not
critical, but the fact that there are increasing marginal costs of external finance clearly is.
'In practice, CD's have been completely exempt from reserve requirements since 1990. However,
even before then, CD's were typically subject to much lower reserve requirements than demand deposits.
As Romer and Romer (1990) observe, reserve requirements on demand deposits have typically been in
the 10 to 20 percent range during the postwar period; while the requirement on large denomination CD's
of short maturity has ranged from 3 to 6 percent.
13In the polar case where a1 =a3=0,external finance can be raised in perfectly elastic
supplyatthe security-market interest rate of zero. This is essentially the Modigliani-Miller style
assumptionmade by Romer andRomer(1990). Aswill beseenshortly, this assumption is
sufficientto shut down the lending channel completely—itimpliesthat r=0always.
However,ourworkinghypothesis--andthis is what we will be seekingto testbelow—is
thatthe assumption that a = a7 = 0 is likelyto beunrealistic.In other words, the M-M
propositiondoes not hold, andthereareimperfectionsin the marketfornon-deposit external
finance.Take for example the case of largedenominationCD's that is emphasized by Romer
andRomer (1990). Given that such CD's are not federally insured, investors purchasing them
must concern themselves with the quality of the issuing bank. If there is some degree of
asymmetric information between the bank and investors, the standard sorts of adverse selection
problems (see, e.g., Myers and Majluf 1984) will arise.9 These considerations will tend to
make the marginal cost of external financing an increasing function of the amount raised.
Indeed, rather than simply assuming the form we do for costs of external finance at times
1 and 2, we could derive our results in a multi-period adverse selection model. A companion
paper, Stein (1994), sketches exactly such a model. While this sort of adverse selection model
is expositionally much more cumbersome than the simple quadratic-cost formulation we adopt,
it yields all the same basic predictions. Thus the quadratic-cost version we present here is best
'The notion that investors are concerned with the default risk of large CD's—and have less-than-
perfect ability to assess such risk—is consistent with the facts that I) bank CD's are evaluated by no less
than five rating agencies; and 2) the rates paid by different quality issuers can vary considerably. More
generally, evidence that commercial banks face adverse selection problems in raising external finance is
provided by the event study results of Keeley (1989), Poloncheck, Slovin and Suslika (1989), Wansley
and Dhillon (1989), and Cornett and Tehranian (1994). All of these papers document that stock issues
by banks are taken as "bad newC—they are greeted with significantly negative stock-price reactions.
14thought of as a heuristic device that communicates the main points of the more elaborate adverse
selectionmodel,illustrates the logic behind our empirical work, but spares the disinterested
reader some of the technical details.
Ofcourse,adverseselection is not the only waytogenerate increasing marginal costs of
external finance. As much recent work in corporate finance and macroeconomics makes clear,
this property is shared by a number of other models involving agency and/or information
problems. To take just one other example, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) demonstrate
explicitly how a variant of the costly-state-verification model due to Townsend (1979) and Gale-
Hellwig (1985) leads to a convex cost function for external funds. Thus all we are really doing
with our quadratic cost formulation is imputing to banks—in shorthand form--a generic version
of the sort of capital market imperfection that is by now standard in the literature on non-
financial firms)°
Even if information or agency problems are not present, there may be other reasons why
a bank effectively has increasing costs of replacing lost deposits. In a costly search type setting,
potential investors in a bank's non-deposit liabilities may not all be aware of the return
opportunities offered by that bank. In order to draw in more investors, the bank might therefore
have to spend more, either by advertising, or by raising its rates relative to those on well-known
alternatives such as T-bills.
The bottom line of this discussion is twofold. First, there are a number of reasons why
'°ln terms of applications of this paradigm to banking finns, our model is perhaps most closely related
to recent work by Lucas and McDonald (1992), who explicitly adopt an asymmetric informationmodel
of bank portfolio choice. Although they do not focus on monetary policy, their model shares with ours
the feature that imperfections in the market for non-deposit external finance give rise to a precautionary
demand for securities.
15it seems plausible thatbanks,like non-financial corporations, might have increasing costs of
external finance. Second, as with non-financial corporations, it seems likely that these costs
would be more pronounced for small banks than for large banks. That is, it seems reasonable
to hypothesize thatand a2 would be larger for small banks. This latter observation wilt be
the basis for our cross-sectional tests.
Having spelled out our basic assumptions, we are now in a position to characterize a
bank's portfolio choice at times 1 and 2. It is easiest to work backwards from time 2. The bank
enters this period with loans of L, securities of S, and non-deposit financing of E1 already on
the balance sheet. The time-2 value of demand deposits, M2, is then realized. We can
distinguish among two cases:
Case I: E1 +M2>L.In this case, the bank can continue to fund its illiquid loan
portfolio without resorting to any new external finance at time 2, simply by drawing down on
its buffer stock of securities. Note that it will always prefer to draw down the securities first,
since this is effectively a zero-cost way of making up any funding shortfall.
Case 2: B1 + M2 c L. In this case, even after liquidating all of its securities holdings,
the bank is still short of funds. Thus it has to make up the rest with new external financing, E2.
The net result is that E2 is given by:
=max(O,L-E1-M2) (2)
The costs associated with this new external funding are given by cv2E22/2. From the
perspective of time I, the ex-arne expectation of time-2 funding costs is given by:
16Expectation(a2E22/2) = a2(L -- pM - (l-p)M + 7/2)2/6 (3)
Wearenow in a pOSittCfl to formulate the time 1 optimization problem.At time 1, the
bankchooses L and E1 (and hence implicitly also chooses S = M1 + E1 - L) to maximize:
max: rL-cx1E12i2 - -- pM1-(1-p)M+ y/2)I6 (4)
Thesolution to this problem is given by:
= 1/a1 (5)
L=rice1 +3r1a2+ pM1+ (1-p)M -7/2 (6)
S=M1+E1-L-3r/a2+(1-p)(M1-M)+7/2 (7)
Theresults have an intuitive interpretation. First, the amount of external funding at time
1, E1,is simplyset so as to equate the marginal cost of obtaining an additional dollar of funds,
a1E1,to themarginalreturn onan additional loan,r.
Second,loan supply ispositivelyinfluencedbythe valueofM1,as well as by the loan-
securityspreadr. The closer area1 and a2 to zero, the more responsive are loans to r.In the
limiting casewhere either a1ora2is zero, any positivevalue ofrgeneratesaninflnite loan
17supply. Finally, loan supply is negatively influenced by which is a measure of the conditional
variance of M2. This is because the moreuncertainty thereis about M2, the less inclined banks
will be to hold illiquid loans, as opposed to liquid securities.
Finally,securities holdingsare positively related to both M1 and the conditional variance
ofM2, andnegativelyrelated to the loan-security spread r. Also, since banksholdsecuritiesto
avoidhavingtoraise externalfundsat time 2, those that find external financingparticularly
costly--i.e.,thosewithhighervalues of cr2--will hold more securities. One important piece of
intuition that will play a role later on is this: a bank's portfolio mix between loans and securities
isinformativeabout the spread r that it is facing at the margin. Thus if we see a bank shift
towardsholding agreaterratioof loans to securities, this indicates that it has experienced a rise
in r.
3.2Equilibriumwith a Homogeneous. Comnetitive Loan Market
Thesimplestway to closethemodel is by assumingthatthere is a single, homogeneous
economy-wide loan market. In this loan market, demand shouldbea function of the loan rate
r, as well as general economic conditions, which we denote by Y. A linear representation of
aggregate loan demand is thus:
L9Y-kr (8)
Market equilibrium is then determined by equating aggregate loan demand to aggregate
loan supply, where aggregate supply is the sum of the supplies of the individual banks, which
18are given by (6). Of course, these individual bankscaneach have their own values of a, and
a2.
Thekey empirical implications of the model flow from these differences in a, anda2.
Toillustrate these implications most cleanly, let us assume thatchanges inthe stance of
monetary policy have an equal effect on the deposits of all banks. That is, for any two banks
i and j,dM1'=dM1."This allows us to summarize the stance of policy simply by an
unsuperscripted M,.
We can now differentiate (6) and (7) to obtain the following expressions for any bank i:
dL'/dM, =p +(1/cr,'+ 3/a21)drIdM1 (9)
dSVdM,=(I-p) -(3/a2)dr/dM, (10)
Given the nature of loan demand, one can show that theeffectof monetary policy on the
loan-security spread, dr/dM,, has the form:
dr/dM, =adY/dM1-b (11)
where a and b are both positive constants. So long as the direct effect of monetary policy on
"We are making this assumption only to illustrate the logic of our tests more transparently. Wewill
be careful to check that itdoesnot color our empirical work below.
19loan demand,dY/dM1, is not toolarge,it will be the case that dr/div!1 C 0—i.e., that monetary
policyworks in part via a lending channel. In this case, equations (9) and (10) yield the
following testable predictions:
Prediction 1: The lending volume of small banks (those with larger values of a1 arid a2)
declines more rapidly in response to a given contraction in deposits thandoes thelendingvolume
of largebanks.
Prediction2: The securities holdings of small banks declinemore slowly in response to
agiven contraction in deposits than do thesecuritiesholdingsof largebanks.
These predictionsfollow immediately from (9)and (10),in conjunction with the
observationthat, in a singleeconomy-wide loan market, there is a singleloan rate,so dr/dM1
isthe same for all banks. The intuition for the lending volume result is straightforward. Since
we have assumed that all banks are hit by the same deposit and loan demand shocks, cross-
sectional differences in lending volume must reflect differential loan supply responses. And if
small banks find it costlier to make up for a monetary-policy induced shortfall in hinds, they will
in factcuttheir loan supply by more.
The securities result is slightly subtler. All else equal, the more a bank cuts it securities
at time I, the more it may be forced to seek external finance at time 2. Because small banks
find this possibility more daunting, they value securities more at the margin, and hence are less
willing to cut them.
20Thus ifone is willing to maintain the assumption of a single, homogeneous loan market,
testingthe model is fairly straightforward. However, the maintained assumption required to do
the test may not be very appealing. To see why, suppose that the evidence does in fact support
both predictions. A natural skeptical reaction might be: "This doesn't necessarily prove that
the monetary contraction had more of an effect on small banks' loan supply. Rather, it might
be that the change in policy had more of an effect on small banks' loan demand. Perhaps small
banks tend to lend to smaller, more recession-sensitive customers. Thus when there is a
tightening of policy, and aggregate demand falls--say due to the textbook 'money channel'in
action--the loan demand curve facing small banks shifts in more than the loan demand curve
facing big banks. Given this inward shift in loan demand, small banks will naturally tend tolend
less and invest more in securities relative to large banks."
3.3 Hetero2eneous Loan Demand
In order to entertain this possibility, one obviously has to consider a situation where
banks can face heterogeneous demand conditions. The simplest wayto do so is to treateach
individual bank as a monopolist, facing its own individual demand curve for loans. Although
this is obviously extreme, it is sufficient for the present purposes. Moreover, thenotion that
banks have some degree of market power with their customers—due, possibly toinformational
"lock-in" effects--is supported in recent theoretical and empirical research. (See, e.g., Sharpe
(1990), Rajan (1992) and Petersen and Rajan (1992)).
We now assume that each bank i now faces its own loan demandschedule of the
following form:
21LD' =Y'-k? (12)
Thus each bank's loan demandschedule may be shifted differently by contractionary monetary
policy.That is, Y, and hence dY'/dM1, may vary systematically across banks. This allows us
to consider the possibility that, say, the loan demand facing small banks is harder-hit by a
monetary-policy-induced recession than is the loan demand facing large banks. Also, each bank
nowhasits own loan-security spread t
In this case, thebanks portfoliodecisions are of theform:
=(r+Lr'(L))/cr1 (13)
L = (1/a1 + 3/a2)(r + Lr'(L))÷pM1+ (l-p)M- y/2 (14)
S = M1 + E1 - L=-3(r+ Lr'(L))/a2+(1-p)(M1- M) +7/2 (15)
Theseequations are of exactlythe sameform as (5)- (7)above, except that (r +Lr'(L))
has replaced r everywhere. Thisis a consequenceof the fact that banks now behaveas
monopolists,rather than price takers. Note that by virtue of our linear demand assumption,
r'(L) is simply given by -Ilk.
Correspondingly, the reaction of bank i's loan volume and securities holdings to a change
in monetary policy are given by:
22dL1/dM1 =tip + (1/a1' + 3/a2)drYclM1) (16)
dS'/dM1=1-gp-(3f/a21)dr'/dM1 (17)
where f =11(1+ l/kc1' + 31ka21)and g=(1+ 1/ka1)I(1+ lIka1' + 3Ikcr2)are both
between0 and 1 The expressionfor loans is of thesame form as (9), with two differences.
First, it has been modified to take account of the effects of monopoly power--this accounts for
the presence of the new parameter f. In the limiting case as k becomes infinite--i.e., as loan
demand becomes perfectly elastic--f converges to one, as in the competitive case. Second, and
much more important for our purposes, dr'/dM1 can now vary across banks.
It is easy to show that dr'/dM1 has the following form:
drYdM1 =a(a11,a2')dY'/dM1 -b(a11,a21) (18)
where what is important to now note is that both a(a1, a21) and b(a11, a21) are increasing
functions of a1 and a21. One implication of (18)is that if dY/dM1 is close to zero, so that loan
demand shifts do not play an important role, then the loan rate for small bankswill be more
sensitive to monetary policy than will the loan rate for large banks. This makes intuitive sense:
it is harder for small banks to offset a loss in reserves by raising external funds; thus they wish
to cut lending by more and will do so until the loan rate rises by more. On the other hand, it
is also possible that in equilibrium the loan rate for small banks will be less sensitive to
23monetary policy.This can happen if loan demand for small banks is more procyclical—i.e., if
dY/dMJis significantlygreaterforsmallbanks.
Equations (16) and (18) therefore make precise the criticismraised earlier. Onecan no
longerunambiguously identify loansupply effects of monetary policy simply by comparing
dLJdM1across banks. On the one hand, dLIdM1 could be larger for small banksbecauseof the
loan supply effect--small banks' supply scheduleshifts in by morewhenthe Fed tightens. On
theother hand, dL/dM1 could also be larger for small banks because of a loan demand effect—
that is, because the demand for small bank loans is more procyclical thanthedemand for large
bank loans.
While one may no longer be able to achieve identification by considering just the
differential movements in lendingvolumeacross banks, itmaybe possible to do better by also
considering movements in securities holdings.Intuitively, the presence of simultaneous loan
demand and supply shocks implies that information on loan volume alone is insufficient, but that
information on lending ra would be very helpful. For example, if loan demand falls for some
subset of banks, then theirlendingvolume will fall andtheir loanrate r will falltoo.If on the
other hand, loan supply falls, then lending volume will fall, but the loanrater will rise.Even
though movements in r are not observable, they might in principle be inferred by looking at
movements in securities.
Unfortunately, using securities movements to infer movements in r is somewhat tricky.
This can be understood by examining equation (17). There are now two competing effects.
First, as in the homogeneous demand case, the direct effect of a large a2 is to make securities
holdings sensitive to monetary policy for small banks. However, this may be offset if
24dr'/dM1 is larger in absolute magnitude for small banks. If the latter effect is strong enough,
itmay even be possible to have a situation where small bankscuttheirsecuritiesholdings by
rnr thanlarge banks inthe wake ofa contraction in monetarypolicy.
Theintuition for this sort of result is as follows. A contraction in monetary policy
initially leads a given small bank to cut loan supply. If the loan demand schedule facing the
bank is more or less unchanged, andthisdemand schedule is relatively inelastic, there will be
a sharp increase in the bank's loan-security spread. This will lead the bank to favor loans in its
portfolio relative to securities, and hence to be more willing to cut securities in order to maintain
lending volume.
Prediction 3: A given contraction in deposits can cause securities to fall more for small
banks than for large banks, but only under certain conditions. In particular, drVdM1 must be
significantly larger in absolute value for small banks, which in turn requires that: 1) loan
demand shocks not differ too much across banks; and 2) loan demand be sufficiently inelastic
(i.e., that k be relatively small).If these two requirements are not both satisfied--as, e.g., in
the perfect competition/homogeneous demand case, where 2) fails to hold--then the prediction
will be reversed.
The upshot of this is that the relative movements in securities holdings across large and
small banks may be able to provide a decisive test for loan supply effects. If we were to find
that small banks cut their securities by more than big banks after a contraction in monetary
policy, this could only be explained by the loan supply story. Indeed, such a finding would
25directly contradict the competing hypothesis that small bank loan demand is more procyclical.
However, such a test is a potentially very stringent one. This is because the data has to
beable to jointly reject kcth: 1) the null hypothesis that there are no loansupplyeffects; as well
as 2) the hypothesis thatloan demandis fairly elastic. Therefore,we maywell failto find the
evidencethat we are lookingfor,even ifloan supplyeffects arein fact very important.
The overallmessage to takeawayfrom the model isthat wehavetwo basic types of
cross-sectional tests toconsider.The firstisto simplycomparethe evolution of largeand small
banklendinE volume in response to a monetary shock. Our theorypredictsthatsmallbank
lending willreactmore strongly. Thepotentialproblemwiththistest isthat itmaynotbe
stringentenough, in the sense that itmaynot adequately discriminate between loansupplyeffects
and heterogeneous demand shocks.
The second test is to compare the evolution of large andsmallbank security holdings in
response to a monetary shock. If small banks react moresensitively along this dimensiontoo,
wewould consider this to be strong evidence in favor of our model. However, iflargebanks
reactmore sensitively, the interpretationis ambiguous--such a finding would certainly fit with




The data on loans, securities and deposits that are usedtotest the model axe taken from
26the quarterlyregulatoryreports that all federally insured banks must submit to the Federal
Reserve.The primary advantageofdrawing on the "Call Reports"isthat they provide a nearly
comprehensivesurvey of banks operatingin theUnitedStates.Themaindisadvantageis that
thereports are designed to provide information for regulatory purposes. Because of this
regulatory focus, the same information is not necessarily collected for all banks -- big banks are
required to provide more information. Similarly, as the banking industry evolves the type of
information that is collected changes, so that constructing long time series is often difficult.
These general characteristics of the Call Reports constrain our empirical work in two
ways. First, a consistent format for the reports to which we had access is only available starting
in 1976. So our sample begins in 1976, and runs through 1992 Q2. Even starting at this point,
we are still only able to track series that are collected for all banks. To ease some of the
regulatory burden on large banks, large banks are only required to supply data on a consolidated
basis, i.e. aggregating foreign and domestic data. As a theoretical matter, it is not obvious
whether it makes more sense to use consolidated or domestic-only data—this would in principle
depend on the extent to which banks' domestic and foreign offices operate separately from each
other.'2 However, because of the data collection convention we have no choice but to study
the consolidated data.
A second significant constraint in using the Call Reports is that a major overhaul in the
format of the reports occurred in the first quarter of 1984. At that point, banks were asked to
provide much more detailed aa and the definitions of many series were adjusted. For instance,
the breakdown on the types of securities that were required to be reported was adjusted. Prior
12 We do, however,limitthe sample to domestically chartered banks.
27to 1984, holdings of various types of U.S. Governmentsecuritiesand state and local securities
were separately reported. Following 1984, these securities were lumped togetherinto a single
series that also included holdings of all other bonds, stocks and securities. Thus, it is impossible
to reliably track disaggregated types of securities. While smaller typesof data definition changes
occur almost continuously, the 1984 Qi shift was so significant that itaffected almost all series,
so in our empirical work we include a dummy variable to account forthis shift.
A final consideration to note is that we are using data on banks, not bank holding
companies. In many cases, a single bank holding company may own severalof the banks in our
sample. This distinction matters when we assign banks to size categories. For example,it is
possible that we will assign a given bank to the "small" category, even if it is a subsidiaiyof
a very large bank holding company. Again, it is not obvious what the theoretically correct thing
to do is here. However, the important point to recognize is that any misclassiflcations will
only have the effect of making our empirical tests more conservative--they will make it harder
to identify any differences across size categories that do in fact exist.
The remaining data on inflation, interest rates and output growth are taken from the
Citibase data bank. A complete description of the Citibase series and the Call Report data are
provided in the data appendix.
4.2 Formation of Size Categories
A first step in our analysis is to sort banks into categories that reflect differences in the
costs of raising external funds. We partition banks based on their total assets, reflecting the
hypothesis that large banks face lower costs of external financing. We then study the time series
28movements in the different categories. A potential problem with this type of exercise is that our
series could be affected by banks that drift across categories. For instance, if several small
banks merge to form one big bank, then at the time of the merger the total assets of the big"
category will surge and the total assets of the "small" category will drop.
To avoid these sorts of problems, we adopt the following procedure.In any two
adjacent quarters, say 1986 QI and Q2, we identify all the banks that have not undergone a
merger and that have complete data for both quarterstherefore banks that fail or are newly
born are also excluded. We then rank all banks by their total assets in the first quarter (i.e.,
1986 QI) and usethisranking to assign them to a particular size category. We then form 1986
QI and 1986 Q2 aggregated balance sheets, summing up over all the banks in a given size
category. Using these aggregated balance sheets, we can then compute for each size category
the growth rates for the variables of interest --e.gloans, securities, etc. We then repeat the
entire procedure for the next pair of quarters, 1986 Q2 and 1986 Q3.Thuswe reconstruct our
size categories from scratch every quarter in order to compute a careful set of growth rates for
that quarter.
The main advantage of this procedure is that it prevents banks' crossing between
categories from influencing the growth rates. This approach also allows us to use the maximum
amount of data, since in any quarter when a bank is not involved in a merger, it will be included
in one of the size categories. Unfortunately, by focusing on growth rates we lose the ability to
recover the levels for the data --althoughchanges in data definitions already would impair our
29ability to consistently track the levels of most series.'3
4.3A Snapshot of Bank Balance Sheets for Different Size Categories
Table1 gives some basic information on what bankbalance sheets looklike for different
size categories.We focus ona dateroughly at themidpoint ofour sample period--l984 Q2--and
report balance sheet data for six different size categories: banksbelowthe 75th percentileby
assetsize; banksbetween the 75th and90thpercentiles; banks between the 90th and 95th
percentiles;banks between the 95and98thpercentiles; banksbetween the 98th and 99th
percentiles; and banks above the 99th percentile.
Several regularities emerge. On the asset side, larger banks hold significantly less in the
way of cash and securities, and make more loans. This fits with the basic spirit of our model—
we argued above that smaller banks need bigger buffer stocks of cash and securities, because
of their inability to raise external finance easily on short notice. Within the category of loans,
larger banks tend to focus relatively more heavily on C&I lending, while small banks tend to
concentrate relatively more on agricultural, real estate and consumer lending.
On the liability side, the smallest banks have a very simple capital structure—they are
Financed almost exclusively with deposits and common equity. In contrast, larger banks make
significantly less use of deposits and also tend to have substantially less equity)4 The
13Thecumulative growth rates that are implied by our procedure may also be systematically
understated if banks thatengage inmergers tend togrowfaster than average. This is another reason why
any levelscompiled from integratingourgrowthrates would need to beinterpretedwithcaution.
'Ihedifferences between large and small bank equity underscores thefactthat our use of bank size
as a proxy for external market access is an imperfect one. All else equal, one might expect that better
capitalized banks would have an easier time raising external hinds. For example, the better capitalized
is a bank, the less of a problem asymmetric information poses when it attempts to raise funds with
30difference is made up by a numberof other formsof borrowing. For example, the largest two
percent of banks make heavy use of the fed funds market to finance themselves; the smallest
banks do virtually no borrowing in the fed funds market. Given that fed funds are a form of
unsecured borrowing, this difference again fits with the spirit of our model--small banks seem
to find it harder to raise financing with instruments where credit risk is an issue.
5.EmpiricalResults
5.1 The Response of Bank Deoosits to a Monetary Shock
Before testing our model's predictions regarding the response of bank loans and securities
to a monetary shock, we first do some preliminary runs with bank deposits. The idea here is
justto check a basicpremise of our theory--namely, that a tightening in monetary policy does
in fact lead to a contraction ; the deposits available to bQth large and small banks. That this
relationship holds for the aggregate banking sector has already been established by Bernanke and
Blinder (1992); however, we want to make sure that it holds across all different size classes of
banks. As suggested in Section 3, we have no a priori reason to believe that the effect should
be stronger for any particular size class.
We follow Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and others by using the change in the fed funds
uninsured debt liabilities such as large CD's, or subordinated debt. Thus the stronger capital positions
of small banksmay well be--like their largerholdings of cash and securities—an endogenous response to
capital market imperfections. If so. this would tend to attenuate any observable differences between large
and small banks, thereby making it harder for us to find the sorts of results we are looking for. Clearly,
if wewereto further disaggregate the data, it would make sense to control separately for both a bank's
size and its capital position.
31rate as our primary indicator of changes in the stance of monetary policy.'5 In all cases, the
dependent variableisthe growth rate of nominal 'core deposits" for a given size class, where
"core deposits" are defined as total deposits less any deposits in denominations greater than
$100,000. We exclude these large "wholesale" deposits because, as suggested by Romer and
Romer (1990) they have been subject to low reserve requirements, and may in principle be used
by banks to offset Fed-induced shocks to core deposits. Thus in the language of our model,
Romer and Romer might argue that wholesale deposits are really a part of B, not M. However,
as it turns out, the results that we present in Table 2 are little changed if we instead use total
deposits (as did Bernanke and Blinder 1992) instead of core deposits.
In our first specification in Table 2, we regress the growth rate of nominal core deposits
against four lags of the change in the fed funds rate, as well as four lags of the growth rate of
the CPL'6 (In every specification that we report below, we also always include four lags of
the dependent variable, four quarterly dummies and a dummy for 1984 QI, when some of the
data definitions were changed slightly.) We repeat this specification for each of five size
classes: BIG represents the largest 1% of all banks; SMALL98 represents the smallest 98%;
SMALL 95 represents the smallest 95%; etc.
The results of the first specification suggest that a contraction in monetary policy has a
quite similar effect on core deposits across size classes. In particular, in each of the five cases,
"We also experimented with using the Romer (1989) dates as an indicator of monetary policy. See
Section 5.4below formore details.
'61n all our tables, we work with nominal variables, and include the growth of the CPI as an
additional right-hand-side variable. An alternative, slightly more restrictive specification is to work with
all real variables, and to omit the growth of the CI'!fromthe equation. This yields very similar results,
as we discuss in Section 5.4 below.
32the sum of the coefficients on the funds rate is negative--as expected—and of roughly the same
magnitude. (Although the sum is somewhat smaller for the BIG class.)The sum is also
strongly significant for all but the BIG class, where it is marginally significant.
In oursecond specification,we add four lags of the growth in nominal GDP as an
additionalcontrolvariable.Theresults are notmuchdifferent;nowthe sum of the coefficients
onthe fundsrate looks to be virtuallyidentical acrosssizeclasses,withthe largestandsmallest
classeshavingsums of-3.82and-3.84respectively. Sincethe data are annualized, these
estimates imply that a one percent increase in the funds rate eventually leads to a decline in
deposits on the order of four percent. The only other noteworthy point is that the addition of
the GDP control tends to reduce the statistical significance of the fed funds coefficients
somewhat.
Overall,wedraw the following two conclusions from Table 2: First, it seems clear that
a contraction in monetary policy doesindeedlead to a decline incoredeposits for banks of all
size classes. Second, it does not seem that the magnitude of this effect varies in any systematic
way across size classes. Figure I illustrates our basic results. It plots a cumulative response
of core deposits to a fed funds shock for the two extreme size classes—BIG and SMALL75. The
responses are calculated using the coefficient estimates from the second specification (which
includes the GOP control) and an orthogonalization of the vector autoregression where the shock
to the funds rate is ordered last.'7
'71n other words, the picture is drawn under the assumption that the Fed has information about
movements in the current quarter's inflation, GDP. and deposits. In this case, the shock to the finds
rate will be uncorrelated with any other disturbances in the VAR. We follow this convention in all of
the subsequent figures in the paper.
335.2 The Resoonse of Bank Loans to a Monetary Shock
We now focuson themost direct test of our theory: is the lending volume of smaller
banks more sensitive to monetary policy than the lending volume of large banks? The results
are presented in Table 3. The structure of Table 3 is analogous to that of Table 2, except that
the dependent variable is now the growth rate of nominal total loans in any given size category.
Indeed, the first two specifications in Table 3 are exactly the same as those in Table 2: we use
changes in the fed funds rate as our monetary policy indicator, and we run the regressions both
with and without an additional set of nominal GDP controls.
The results uniformly support the predictions of our model. For example, in the first
specification, the sum of the coefficients for the BIG category is 1.25, and is completely
insignificant. The point estimate suggests that a contraction in monetary policy actually
increases large-bank lending in the short run.'8 In contrast, the four SMALL categories have
coefficients with sums that decline monotonically from -2.00 to -2.83, all of which are
statistically significant.
Similar results obtain when we move to the second specification, which adds the nominal
GDPcontrol.The sum of the coefficients for the BIG category is now negative at -1.20, but
still completely insignificant. The coefficients for the four SMALLcategorieshave sums that
continue to be substantially larger in absolute magnitude, ranging from -2.95to-3.48;these
sums are still strongly significant as well. Thus an increase in the funds rate apparently has
much more of a dampening effect on the lending behavior of small banks.
1'Other recent papers (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder 1992, Romer and Romer 1990, and Christiano,
Fichenhaum and Evans 1994) have also found some tendency for certain measures of aggregate lending
volume to react sluggishly or even increase in the short run in response to a monetary contraction. As
will become clear, our work suggests that this is primarily due to the behavior of the largest banks.
34The table also tries two additional specifications, numbers three and four. In both of
these, we use as a measure of the monetary impulse the growth in nominal core deposits for the
size category in question. Thus for example, when studying the BIG category, the key right
hand side variable is the gro y.h in nominal core deposits for the BIG banks. So rather than
using an economy-wide measure of monetary policy such as the fed funds rate1 we are now
allowing each size category to have its own measure. In a sense, this sort of specification is
much closer in spirit to the regressions seen in the literature on non-financial firms, where firms'
investment is regressed on some measure of their n cashflow--own core deposits can be
thought of as a direct analog to own-firm cashflow.
Of course, this change in specification should not make a big difference if, as suggested
by the previous Table 2, shocks to the fed funds rate have a roughly equal-sized impact on BIG
and SMALLcoredeposits. Nonetheless, we thought it was important to try it this way also,
as a way of assessing the robustness of our results.
As before, we estimate four coefficients on the monetary impulse variable. The one
minor difference is that we begin in this case with the contemporaneous value of the growth in
own core deposits, and then add lags one through three. We do this since it seems likely that
a shock to deposits in any given quarter might have an immediate impact on loan volume and/or
securities holdings. However, because the inclusion of this contemporaneous deposit term could
in principle lead to a simultaneity bias, we run the regressions using instrumental variables, with
four lags of the change in the fed funds rate serving as an instrument for the contemporaneous
35deposit term)9
The resultsfrom specificationsthree and four echo those from the earlier ones. The sum
of the coefficientson the own core deposits variable issubstantiallyhigher forbanksinthe
SMALL categories.Forexample, inspecificationthree,the sum of thecoefficientsfor the BIG
banks is-.03 andcompletely insignificant.For the SMALLbankcategories, the sum ranges
from.69 to .84, all of which are very stronglysignificant.In specificationfour, whichaddsthe
nominalGDPcontrol,the sum of the coefficients for BIG banksrisesto .58, but is stillnot
statisticallysignificant. Meanwhile the sum for the SMALL banks ranges from .78 to .95, all
of whichare againvery strongly significant.
Overall, we read the results in Table 3asproviding quite strong support for the model's
predictions regarding loan volume. Figure 2 provides an illustration of these results, plotting
the cumulative impulse response of loans to a shock in the funds rate, for the extreme size
categories. (As in Figure 1, we use our second specification to generate the impulse response
function.)
However, one possible objection is that since we are looking at IQI1 loans, our results
may be driven in part by aggregation effects across loan categories. As was seen in Table 1,
banks in the BIG category concentrate in different types of lending than the banks in some of
the SMALL categories--for example, the larger banks tend to do relatively more C&I lending,
and relatively less real estate lending. One troubling possibility is that what we are picking up
is just differences in the demand-side behavior of these different types of loans. For example,
'We also tried re-running the regressions with OLS. As it turns out, this changes none of our
conclusions. We also find qualitatively similar results if we drop the contemporaneous deposit term
altogether, but in this case the magnitudes are much smaller and the standard errors are larger.
36it may be that C&lloandemand responds less to a monetary contraction than does real estate
loan demand; if this is the case, we might get our results for total loan volume even if BIG and
SMALL banks behaved identically within the C&I loan class.20
This possibility can be at least partially addressed by looking at the behavior of C&I loan
volume, rather than total loan volume. This is done in Table 4. The table is exactly the same
as Table 3, except that we have replaced the total bank loans with bank C&I loans.
Overall, the table suggests that even within the C&I loan class, there are clear-cut
differences across banks in the different size categories. Indeed, the results in Table 4 parallel
those in Table 3 very closely. In each of the four regression specifications, the point estimates
for the sums of the coefficients imply that loan volume is much more sensitive to monetary
policy for banks in the SMALL categories than for BIG banks. Moreover, most (though not all)
of the SMALL-bank regressions yield significant t-statistics. Thus we conclude from Table 4
that our results from total loan volume in Table 3 were probably not driven by aggregation
problems across different loan classes.
Interestingly, as with total loans, BIG-bank C&Iloanvolume actually appears to increase
somewhat in the short run in response to a monetary contraction for two of the four
specifications. Thus to the extent that prior research has documented a tendency for aggregate
measures of loan volume to respond sluggishly—or even in the "wrong direction—to monetary
policy, this would appear to be due in part to the differential behavior of large banks, and more
specifically, to the differential behavior of large-bank C&I lending. (Although we should be
This is really nothing more than a variant of the heterogeneous loan demand story sketched in
Section 3. Ciertler and Gilchrist (l993a, 199Th) present some evidence that suggests that C&I lending
volume responds more sluggishly to monetary shocks than other fbnns of lending.
37cautious withthis conjecture, since none of theresultsfor the BIG class are even close to being
statistically significant)
5.3 The Resoonse of Bank Securities Holdings to a Monetary Shock
We now turn to our final, most stringent set of tests. As discussed above, the strongest
evidence for our theory would be if we found that: 1) not only are SMALL-bank loans more
sensitive to monetary policy; but 2) SMALL-bank securities holdings are as well. What makes
this test a stringent one is that in order for us to find the evidence we are looking for, not only
must our theory of loan supply effects be true, but individual banks must lice relatively inelastic
loan demand schedules.
Table 5 presents the evidence. The structure of Table 5 is identical to that of Tables 3
and 4. The first two specifications--those using the change in the fed funds rate as a measure
of the monetary impulse--yield results for securities holdings that parallel those for lending
volume. In both cases, the point estimates suggest that SMALL-bank securities holdings are
indeed more sensitive to monetary policy than BIG-bank securities holdings. Moreover, the
sums of the coefficients on the funds rate are statistically significant in all the SMALL-category
regressions, and are completely insignificant in the BIG-category regressions. Figure 3 provides
a graphical illustration, tracing out the impulse responses for the extreme size categories; as
before, the impulse responses are computed using our second specification.
The results from the third and fourth specifications are more ambiguous. In the third
specification, the point estimates suggest that BIG-bank securities holdings are actually more
sensitive, although the standard errors for the BIG category continue to be quite large. In the
38fourth specification,the comparison is reversed, so that SMALL-bank securities holdings again
appearto be more sensitive.
Onbalance,theevidence inTable 5 would appearto favor the notion that SMALL-bank
securities holdings are in fact more sensitive to monetarypolicythan BIG-bank securities
holdings. However, this conclusion is a tentative one; the results for securities holdings are not
as clear-cut as they were for lending volume.
Even if the results are not totally decisive in favor of the proposition that SMALL-bank
securities holdings are more sensitive to monetary policy, there is also no real evidence to
support the converse proposition--that SMALL-bank securities holdings are Jsensitiveto
monetary policy. This is an important point. If our earlier lending volume results are to be
explained away by an alternative hypothesis based on heterogeneous loan demand, that
alternative hypothesis would also unambiguously predict that SMALL-bank securities holdings
would be less sensitive to monetary policy.2' Since we do not find this to be the case, we must
conclude that there is no positive evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
In contrast, our theory does not tie down the relative sensitivity of SMALL and BIG-bank
securities holdings--recall that this comparison turns on the elasticity of loan demand.
Therefore, even if the empirical results for securities holdings are interpreted as a dead heat
between SMALL and BIG banks, this would seem to be more damaging to the heterogeneous
loan demand alternative hypothesis than to our theory.
21To remind the reader of the intuition: if smaller banks' loan volume goes down by more in the wake
of a monetary contraction, and if this is due to a disproportionate decline in the loan demand facing small
banks, then one should expect small banks to shift their portfolios towards securities. Thus small banks
would, underthealternative hypothesis, cut securities by ijinresponse to a monetary shock.
395.4 Robustness Cheeks
In addition to the specifications reported in the tables, we tiled a number of other
alternatives, to ensure the robustness of our results. A brief summary is as follows.
5.4.A Romer dates as an alternative indicator of monetary policy
We reran all the regressions corresponding to our first two specifications, substituting a
"Romer dummy" variable for the change in the fed funds rate as our measure of the monetary
impulse. We did so in large part to be consistent with much recent work (including our own)
that has used the Romer (1989) dates as an indicator of monetary policy. Unfortunately, in this
case, our shorter time series only includes three such dates. Moreover, two of these dates—the
August 1978 and the October 1979 ones--are sufficiently close to each other that they cannot
really be considered independent observations. The bottom line is that one should probably
expect any regressions using Romer dates in our sample to be extremely noisy. And indeed, this
is what happens--many of the estimated coefficients are far from being statistically significant.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that if one just looks at the point estimates for the
sums of the coefficients, they all tell the same story: total loans, C&Iloansand securities all
are cut more by SMALL banks than by BIG banks in the wake of a Romer date. This is true
both for the specifications that include a nominal GDP control and those that do not. Thus
while the results may not be very precise, they all go in the direction of supporting our theory.
5.4.B Cutting off the sample in 1989 because of the "capital crunch"
We also redid all the tables completely, with the sample period ending in 1989 QI rather
40than in 1992 Q2. We did so becauseofa concern thatour conclusionsmight be affected by the
so-called "capital crunch" that arose as capital-deficient banks struggled to meet the new Basle
standardsthat were beingphased in through 1992. (See, e.g., Bernanke and Lawn 1991 for a
discussion.) If thecapitalcrunch did indeedaffectbankportfoliobehavior, and if these effects
varied systematicallyacrosssizeclasses--aswell they might, since smaller banks are
systematically bettercapitalized--thenour regressionresultscould conceivably beaffected.
As it turns out however, truncatingthesample periodin thiswaydoes notmarkedly
affect ourresults.For totalloans andC&I loans, we still find thatSMALLbanks reactmore
sensitivelythan BIGbanksto changes inthe stance of monetary policy, forevery one of our
specifications.Indeed, in most specifications,theparameter estimates arealmostidentical to
those shown inTables3and 4. And when this is not the case, the differentialbetweenSMALL
and BIGbanks actually appears to be slightly pronounced when we use the shorter sample
period.Thus it seems clear that our results for total loans and C&I loans are not in anyway
driven by capital crunch effects.
The one specification where changing the sample period makes a noteworthy difference
is in the second specification for securities holdings. Using this specification in the longer
sample period, we saw in Table 5 that SMALL banks appeared to cut securities by more than
BIG banks in response to a monetary shock; moreover, the sum of the coefficients on the funds
rate for SMALL banks was (marginally) statistically significant. This result disappears when
we truncate the sample in 1989. Now the sum of the coefficients for SMALL banks falls below
that for BIG banks, and becomes completely insignificant. Thus if we focus on the shorter
sample period, the results for securities become overall very ambiguous--it is hard to conclude
41that there are clear-cut patterns in any direction.
5.4.C Real.ratherthan nominal specifications
Finally, we also redid all the tables, using real rather than nominal valuesof deposits,
loans, securities and GDP, and omitting the CPI terms from the regressions.This can be
thought of as a slightly more constrained variant of the specificationsdescribed above. The
findings here parallel those frm our previous robustness check with theforeshortened sample.
In particular, the results for total loans and C&I loans are impervious to the change in
specification; every regression continues to show that SMALL banks' lending volume is more
sensitive to monetary policy than that of BIG banks. The results for securities holdings, on the
other hand, again seem to be somewhat more sensitive to the specification used--now three out
of the four regressions actually show securities being more sensitive for BIG banks. This is
essentially the opposite of what we found in Table 5.
Thebottom Une from our various robustness tests is this: the results for total loans and
C&l loans appear to be extremely robust. In contrast, the results for securities holdings appear
to be more sensitive to the specification used. When combined with the fact that our baseline
results for securities in Table 5werealready less than completely clear-cut, this leads us to
conclude that it is hard to say anything very confidently about the relative sensitivity of SMALL
and BIG-bank security holdings.
Again,however,it is important to keep the ambiguous results for securities holdings in
perspective. While they may not allow us to decisively reject the heterogeneous-loan-demand
42alternative explanation for our loan volume results, they also do not provide any positivesupport
for thisalternative explanationeither. Moreover, the ambiguous results for securities are also
completely consistent with a version of our theory in which loan demand is relatively elastic.
6. Summary and Conclusions
The basic theme of this paper has been that banking firms may be subject to the same
sort of capital market imperfections as their non-financial counterparts. One implication of this
view is that monetary policy will work in part through a lending channel: when the Fed drains
deposits from the system, banks cannot frictionlessly make up the funding shortfall by raising
non-deposit external finance. Consequently, their lending behavior is affected, and so in turn
is the investment spending of those non-financial firms that rely on banks for funding.
Overall, we interpret our empirical evidence as being clearly consistent with this story.
At the same time, we recognize some of its limitations. Given the level of disaggregation and
the relatively short time series that we were working with, our tests were not as powerful as one
might have liked. Thus while the point estimates tend to line up with the predictions of our
theory, the statistical significance is not always overwhelming.
The natural next step is to further disaggregate the data, in an effort to increase the
power of the tests. For example, we could use the call report data to perform individual bank-
level regressions that are similar in spirit to our size-category regressions. In addition to
increasing the precision of our estimates, this would allow us to control much more carefully
for a number of other factors that might affect individual banks' ability to make loans--e.g., their
capital ratios, etc. We plan to attempt this in future work; at the very least, the results in this
paper are sufficiently encouraging to make such further work worthwhile.
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488. Data Apoendix
Throughout the analysis our size categories are formed by sorting the bankson the basis
of their total assets -- call report item rcfd2l7O. We construct fourmainseries from the call
reports that are used in the empirical work. As mentioned in the text, most of the series in the
call reports were defined differently before and after March of 1984,so most of our series must
be spliced in the first quarter of 1984.
The data for total loans after March 1984 come from item rcfd2l2S in thecall reports.
This series is defined as "loans and leases net of unearned income, allowance andreserve. In
March of 1984, the series was changed to include lease financing receivables, thereforeprior
to March 1984 rcfd2l2S and rcfd2l6S (lease financing receivables) must be summedto insure
comparability. Starting in March 1984, transfer risk reserve is also being netted out. Prior to
that time this type of adjustment does not appear to have existed, so there isno way to avoid a
slight discontinuity.
The data for commercial and industrial loans after March 1984 come from item rcfdl76ó.
Prior to March 1984 we use item rcfdl600. Unfortunately, rcfdl600 includessome bankers'
acceptances that are not included in rcfdl76o, but there is no way to make the two series
comparable because the relevant acceptance numbers are never separately reported.
The data for securities after March 1984 are taken from item rcfdO39O. The definition
of this series was changed in March 1984 to include holdings ofcorporate stock. This
redefinition causes a discontinuity because prior to 1984 it is not possible toseparately add up
all of the items that are now included item rcfdO39O. As an approximationwe sum items
rcfdO400 (U.S.Treasury Securities), rcfdOoOO (U.S. Government Agency and Corporate
49Obligations), rcfdO900 (Obligations of States andPolitical Subdivisions) and rcfdO3SO to get a
comparable series. The data on securities is added todata on cash holdings (itemrcfdOOlO) to
getan overall series for cash and securities.
Finally, we construct estimates of small deposits.This series is constructed by removing
large deposits (the sum of item rcon6645,certificates of deposits of denominations above
$100,000, and item rcon6646, open time deposits of over $100,000)from total deposits (item
rcfd2200). Detailed information on deposits is generally onlyavailable for deposits of the
domestic operations of banks. So although the total deposit data mayinclude deposits held
outside the U.S.forsome banks, information on large or small deposits is onlyavailable for
banks' domestic operations.
For the snapshot of the data given in Table 1 we looked at several otherseries. The
numbers for Federal Funds Sold and Securities Purchased Under Agreements toResell come
from item rcfd 1350. The data on real estate loans, loans to depository institutions, agricultural
loans, loans to individuals and other loans are taken from items rcfdl4lO,rcfdl4S9, rcfdlS9O,
rcfdl975 and rcfd2O8O respectively.
Regarding the liabilities data in Table 1, the information fortransactions deposits and
brokered deposits comes from items rcon22l5 and rcon2365 respectively. The data onFederal
Funds Purchased and Securities Sold Under Agreements to Repurchase are from itemrcfd2SOO.
The numbers for equity and subordinated debt are taken from items rcfd32l0 and rcfd3200.The
data shown for other liabilities is constructed to assure that total assets and totalliabilities
balance.
The data on nominal gross domestic product, the consumer price index (not seasonally
adjusted) and the federal funds rate are variables ()DP, PZIJNEW,andFYFF from Citibase.
50Table I
Composition of Bank Balance Sheets
as of 1984 Q2
Asset Cutoff used to Determine Size Category:
Below Between Between Between Between Above
75th 75thand 90th and 95th and 98thand 99th
90th 95th 98th 99th
percentile percentile percentile percentile percentile
Number 10710 2142 714 429 143 142
ofBanks
Mean Assets (S millions) 27.2 96.6 199.6 454.7 1213.5 8523.5
Median Assets (S millions) 23.6 92.1 191.5 411.1 1165.9 3743.7
Fraction ofTotal .13! .093 .064 .088 .078 .545
System Assets
Fractionof rota.' Assets in Size Qztegwy
Cash& Securities .386 .374 .354 .339 .318 .248
Fed Funds & Repos Lent .050 .047 .G4 .050 .050 .031
TotalLoans .519 .535 .556 .566 .585 .621
RealEstateLoans .187 .207 .212 .191 .181 .115
Loans toDepos.Inst. .002 .004 .007 .011 .023 .051
AgriculturalLoans .076 .030 .014 .008 .007 .006
C&ILoans .126 .153 .172 .187 .188 .281
Loanstolndiv. .122 .129 .132 .137 .140 .075
Other Loans .011 .010 .014 .018 .025 .073
TotalDeposits .882 .880 .864 .830 .800 .729
Transaction Dep. .235 .240 .239 .250 .250 .172
Large Deposits .101 .118 .131 .140 .144 .123
BrokeredDep. .002 .002 .003 ..002 .011 .019
FedFunds & Repos Borrowed .010 .020 .037 .066 .100 .100
Subord. Debt .001 .001 .002 .003 .004 .005
Other Liabilities .018 .021 .025 .031 .034 .118












2. BiG Med funds Angdp. aC?I-2.05 -2.06-.19 .48 -3.82
(-1.24)
2. SMALL98 Medfunds Angdp, ACPI-2.68-.08-.79 .61 -2.94
(-1.02)
2. SMALL 95 Med funds dngdp, ACPI-2.72-.34-.92 .51 -3.46
(-1.29)
2.SMALL 90 Medfunds 4ngdp, SCM-2.65-.32-.90.46 -3.41
(-1.36)
2. SMALL 75 Med funds Migdp,CPI-2.63-.51-.96.27 -3.84
(-1.69)
A11 spifica1ionsalso include four lags of the dependentvariable1tour quasledy dutnndcs. sad a dummy corresponding tot 1984 Qi change
incertaindatadefleiLiona.BothspccWicationaland 2 an estimated by 01-S.
Core DepositsRegressions








1. BiG Med funds 4CPI -1.04 -1.17-.47-.34
1. SMALL 98 Med funds 4CM -2.23-.89 -1.53 .25
I. SMALL 95 Med funds ACPI -2.22 -1.08 -1.56 .17












2. BIG Med funds Angdp,ACPE -1.48-.77 .18 .87 -1.20
(60)
2. SMALL 98 Med funds Angdp, INCH -1.96-.87-.36.23 -2.95
(-2.42)
2. SMALL 95 Sf5funds Angdp, INCPi -2.15-.88-.49.38 -3.15
(-2.68)
2.SMALL 90 Sled funds Angdp, SCPI -2.17-.99-.52 .32 -3.36
(-2.68)
2. SMALL 75 MS hinds INngdp,ssCPI -2.29-.90-.61 .32 -3.48
(-2.63)
AJ1quiricatiooa aS include four lag, of the depandent veneble four qusnedy dummies, and a dunuuy cvntepooding to a 1984 QI change
In cent data definitions. Specification, I and 2 are imsed by OLS, specifications 3 and 4 are estimated by IV, wing lagged changes in the
fed funds rate as an inetnimnit for the contemporaneous own core depoeita variable.
Table 3
Loans Regressions





1 2 1 4
I. BIG Sf5 funds ACM -.39 .15 .55 .94
1. SMALL 98 Med funds AC?! -1.64-.48-.11 .23
1. SMALL95 Med funds ACM -1,85-.56-.36.37
1. SMALL 90 Med funds AC?! -1.89-.64-.42 .34

















4. SMALL9O Sowncoredep. Sngdp,SCPI .79.08-.11 .13 .90
(3.27)
4,SMALL75 Sowocoredep. Angdp.ACfl .81.16-.17 .15 .95
(3.26)
•Al1 sptfleations also include four lags of lbs dependent variable, four çitnmiy dummS. ends dummy conesponding tot 1984 Qi cbange
is oatelu data definitions. Specifications I and 2 eta eclimsled by 01.3, specifications 3 sod 4 are estimated by IV, using lagged cbsngn
isthefat funds nls is so inatnunad for the enslatnpotsoaosa own come deposits variable.
Table 3 (conCd.)
Loans Regesniona
(S nominal loans is dependent variable)
Specification Measure of
MonetaryImnulse
Other r.hs. Coefficientson Monetary
variables' Impulseat lag
Q s a a
3. DIG Aown core dep. ACPI .18-.27 .04 .02
3. SMALL 98 a own core dep. ACP1 .64-.05-.06 .15
3.SMALL95 aowncoredep. aCPI .77-.03-.08.1!
3.SMALL9O Aowncoredep. ACPI .79 .00-.15 .14




S own core dep.
Sown core dep.
A own core dep.
Sngdp. ACPI
Angdp,ACPI
angdp, ACPI_________ Coefficients on Monetary
Impulse at lag Sum
1 2 4 Euus)
2.723.41-1.033.44 8.54
(0.73)







2. BIG Med funds &sgdp, CPI -1.42 -6.73 -2.398.09 -2.45
(-0.18)
2.SMALL 98 Med funds Angdp, ACPI -2.24-.70-.37-.04 -3.35
(-138)
2. SMALL95 Med funds Angdp, CP1 -2.27-.47-.47-.12 -3.33
(-1.91)
2. SMALL 90 Med funds Angdp. aCM -2.49-.18-.99-.20 -3.86
(-2.24)
2.SMALL75 Ma! funds angdp,ACPT -2.22-.40-.86-.17 -3.65
(-2.07)
A11 specification. also include four lags of the deps4set variable, four qusrtaly dumuda,and adummy corresponding to a 1914 QI change in oestiin
data definitions. Specifications I and 2 an admitS by 012, qxciflations 3 and 4 are estimated by IV, sndng lagged changa in the fed fimdsrate










































(a nominal C&i loan is dependent variable)
5cjflcathn Measure of
Monetary Imnulse
Other r.b.s. Coefficients on Monetary
variabln Impulse at lag
Q x a a
-1.65 .63.72 -1.38
3. 1316 a own core dep.
3. SMALL 98 a own coredep. 1CP1 .50-.21-.08 .45
3. SMALL 95 a owncore dep. aCPI .56-.16-.12.51
3. SMALL 90 a own core dep. aCPI .61-.13-.13.56
a own core dep.
S ownairedep.
Lowitcoredep.









4.SMALL75 Sownairedep. Sngdp,SCPI .70.08-.07 .51 1.22
(2.89)
A11 specifications also include four lags of the dependentvanable. tourqusitarty dummies, and a dummy conesponding to a1984 Qlchange
in certain datadefinitions.Specifications Iand2iso estimatedby OLS. specifications 3 and 4 amstimatcd by IV, using lagged changesin the
fedfunds rate as an Instrument foe the eonternpoaneoua own cots deposits variable.Table S
Cash and Securities Regressions
(S nominal cash & securities Is dependent variable)
Sneciflcation Measure of Other r.h.s. Coefficients on Monetary
Monetary inmutse vari4bleC Impulse at lag Sun
1 2 a 4
I. BIG Med funds AC?! -.65-.11-.32 -1.71 -2.85
(-.85)
I. SMALL 98 Med funds ACP! -2.16 •I.56 '1.74-.39 -5.85
(-3.42)
I. SMALL 95 Med funds ACPI -2.22 -1.66 -1.79-.31 -5.99
(.3.41)
I. SMALL 90 Med funds AC?! -2.13 -1.5$-1.82-.32 -5.88
(-3.38)
I.SMALL75 Afedfunds SC?! -1.99-1.44 -1.90-.44 -5.77
(-3.39)
2.BIG Medfunds Angdp, ACP1 -.65.331.18-1.15 -.29
(-.06)
2.SMALL98 Medfunds Angdp, SCM -2.24-.63-.95.07 -3.75
(-1.90)
2. SMALL 95 Afedfunds Angdp, ACPI -2.31-.61-.94.19 -3.67
(-1.83)
2, SMALL90 Medfunds Angdp. SC?! -2.20-.55-1.01 .12 -3.64
(-1.81)
2.SMALL 75 Med funds Sngdp, ACPI -2.11-.44-1.11-.07 -3,73
(-1.81)
tUl specifiariousalso include flnr lap of the dependent variable, four quastesty dummies, and a dummy conteponding to a I9MQIchange
in certain Ma definitictia. SpecificationaI and 2are sin.t.4 by01.3, apedficadow3 and 4 an estimated by IV, itheg lagged changre in the
led hinds rate., en instrument for the contemporaneous own core deposits variable.Table 5(coot'd.)
Cash and Securities Regressions
(a nominalcash & securities isdependent variable)
çiIication Measure of Other r.h.s. Coefficienls on Monetary
Monetary Imjtuise yatiahltC tmpulse at lag Sum
Q 12 1
3. BIG 6own core dep. SCPI 1.93-.22-.07-.23 1.41
(1.64)
3. SMALL 98 4 own core dep. SCPI .89-.14 .12-.18 .68
(2.76)
3.SMALL95 Sowncore dep. SCPI .94-.18 .21-.22 .74
(2.67)
3. SMALL 90 Sown core dep. SCPI .91-.15 .21-.21 .77
(2.58)
3. SMALL 75 Sown core dep. ACPI .90-.12 .26-.27 .76
(2.48)
4. BIG S own core dep. Sngdp, SCPI .91-.15-.24 .07 .59
(.97)
4. SMALL 98 S own core dep. 4ngdp SCM .81-.03 .17-.05 .90
(3.70)
4.SMALL95 aowncoredep. Sngdp,SCPI .86-.07.26-.07 .99
(3,67)
4.SMALL9O aowncoredep. Sngdp1SCPI .84-.05 .29-.05 1.02
(3.59)
4.SMALL7S Sowncoredep. Sngdp,SCPI .83-.07.36-.12 1.00
(3.32)
A11 apecifiatiums also include tour lags of the dependent variable, four quartesly dumudea, and a dummy conespcmding tot1984 QI change
in cestain data definitions. Spcciflatiocs land 2 ue estimated by OLS, specifications 3 and 4am estimated by IV, using laggedthangc* in the
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Simulated Response of Large and Small Bank Securities
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